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Abstract

The purpose of this Article is to illustrate the challenges state regulators face when attempting to translate
theory into practice in the context of health care risk regulation. Section I reviews the evolution of the riskbearing market in health care, recognizing that while risk is an inherent part of everyday life, it takes on a
delicate meaning when used in the context of health care. Cost and demographic data will be discussed to
provide a compelling rationale for the ongoing forceful movement toward cost containment strategies
embodied in managed care strategies, as well as the need to develop the next generation of risk-bearing
entities. Sections II and III provide an overview of state health care regulation and an examination of
Minnesota's regulatory experience. Sections IV through VII detail the emergence and ongoing development of
direct contracting strategies.
Throughout this Article, strategies will be reviewed from both a theoretical and practical perspective. These
experiences can teach valuable lessons and underscore the challenges inherent in translating theory into
practice, and the obvious, yet unwilling tradeoffs that are necessary to truly reform the health care regulatory
infrastructure. The Article will conclude with a set of guiding principles that should be considered by state
regulators in the development and oversight of new and emerging risk-bearing entities.
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Regulating Risk in a Managed Care
Environment: Theory vs. Practice, The
Minnesota Experience
Barbara C. Colombo and Robert P. Webber*
INTRODUCTION

As the twentieth century draws to a close, it seems fitting to
take a collective step back and examine the triumphs and struggles that illustrate the last one hundred years. Health care is
certainly no exception. For the better part of this century, the
private sector health care delivery system presented a relatively
uncomplicated, stable picture. The patient, complaining of some
sort of ailment, sought curative medical care from the family
doctor, who was fully reimbursed for each and every service provided. The last ten years, however, have made up for this relatively uneventful past with health care reform proposals and
regulatory changes occurring at a dizzying pace.
Today, the health care delivery system is anything but uncomplicated. Now, the consumer receives a predetermined set of
benefits, oftentimes with a preventive focus, which may or may
not emanate from regulatory mandates, delivered through a network of health care providers, including, but rarely limited to,
physicians, who are compensated through a variety of complicated reimbursement schemes. This new and evolving health
care system is a work in progress and continues to provoke a
wide range of debate at both the state and federal level.
Minnesota has certainly contributed to the evolution of this
system and is recognized as one of the most dynamic markets in
the country, at times referred to as "the land of ten thousand
examples." One clear and inevitable byproduct of Minnesota's
evolving market has been a growing level of apprehension, confusion and frustration among some health care consumers.
These concerns do not stop at Minnesota's borders, however.
Indeed, the national media would suggest that consumer dissat* Barbara C. Colombo is Director of the Center for Health Law & Policy, Centers for Law & Leadership, William Mitchell College of Law. She received her Juris
Doctor from William Mitchell College of Law. Robert P. Webber received his Juris
Doctor from William Mitchell College of Law in 1999.
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isfaction with the United States' health care system is at an alltime high.' Popular opinion continues to be concerned about
consolidation, compromises in quality and lack of provider
choice.
Consumer dissatisfaction is predictable if one considers society's long-standing and irreconcilable expectations of health
care: unlimited freedom of choice and the highest quality in
health care. Although unwilling to pay the necessary price,
Americans support and believe they deserve universal coverage
because any other position would be politically distasteful. The
vast majority of Americans view health care as an entitlement,
similar to, and no less deserved, than education. Such comparisons are not only inaccurate, but lead to an ever-expanding gap
between expectations and reality.
As a result, national health policy is at a crossroads. The
health care system must either undergo a fundamental metamorphosis, abandoning a market-driven system for one in which
services are available for all and guaranteed by the government
through aggressive taxation, or consumers must adjust their expectations to more closely match the limitations that are necessarily a part of reality. This conclusion does not suggest that
aspirations of mediocrity are desirable, but that economic, political and practical constraints of the health care system must factor into any meaningful debate.
Consumers are not alone in their dissatisfaction with the
health care system. Providers sense limitations in their freedom
to practice medicine, looming financial pressures imposed by
managed care, and a general concern about corporate and government intrusion into the patient-provider relationship. Employers are also experiencing unprecedented challenges. With
unemployment at some of the lowest rates ever, prospective employees often may choose among multiple attractive offers.
Clearly, employee benefit packages that include health care coverage can be highly influential.
1. See, e.g., Sandra G. Boodman, "The High Price of Health" Traces Managed
Care's Rise; PBS Show Looks at Quality and Accountability, WASH. POST, Apr. 14,
1998 (describing a PBS documentary characterizing HMOs in an extremely negative
fashion); Louise Kertesz, Backlash Continues: Survey Finds Managed Care Is Still the
Bad Guy in Many Americans' Eyes, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Nov. 10, 1997, at 33; Susan
Brink & Nancy Shute, Are HMOs the Right Prescription?,U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Oct. 13, 1997, at 60; Norman Ornstein, HMO's Rightful Credo: No Pain, No Gain,
USA TODAY, Mar. 24, 1997, at 15A; Edward Dolnick, Death by HMO-One Woman's Horror Story, GLAMOUR, Feb. 1996, at 158 (all of these articles describe by
anecdote the criticisms of HMOs and managed care).
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In view of these wide-ranging concerns, elected officials have
come under intense pressure to create new health care strategies
and to do so in short order. In the end, the state regulator is left
with the unenviable task of implementing the reform strategy of
the week, one which can often be characterized as well intended, but ill conceived, and either potentially in conflict with
existing law, or simply impractical.
The purpose of this Article is to illustrate the challenges state
regulators face when attempting to translate theory into practice
in the context of health care risk regulation. Section I reviews
the evolution of the risk-bearing market in health care, recognizing that while risk is an inherent part of everyday life, it takes
on a delicate meaning when used in the context of health care.
Cost and demographic data will be discussed to provide a compelling rationale for the ongoing forceful movement toward cost
containment strategies embodied in managed care strategies, as
well as the need to develop the next generation of risk-bearing
entities. Sections II and III provide an overview of state health
care regulation and an examination of Minnesota's regulatory
experience. Sections IV through VII detail the emergence and
ongoing development of direct contracting strategies.
Throughout this Article, strategies will be reviewed from both
a theoretical and practical perspective. These experiences can
teach valuable lessons and underscore the challenges inherent in
translating theory into practice, and the obvious, yet unwilling
tradeoffs that are necessary to truly reform the health care regulatory infrastructure. The Article will conclude with a set of
guiding principles that should be considered by state regulators
in the development and oversight of new and emerging riskbearing entities.
I.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE HEALTH RISK-BEARING MARKET

A.

The First Generation

For most of this century, health care services were provided
through a traditional fee-for-service system. Physicians, acting
2. This article is not meant to be an exhaustive, fifty-state study of risk regulation,
but considers one state's regulatory approach to risk-bearing health care entities.
3. A fee-for-service medical system is one where "patients, sometimes directly,
but more often through their employers, purchased indemnity insurance plans that
reimbursed physicians retrospectively for care on a fee-for-service basis." See Stephen R. Latham, Regulation of Managed Care Incentive Payments to Physicians,22
AM. J. L. & MED. 399, 399-400 (1996) (describing the traditional fee-for-service system and the financial incentives for physicians that encouraged excessive treatment).
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largely on their own and on behalf of their patients, determined
the manner and extent to which health care services were provided.4 They submitted their bills to the insurance company,
and the company paid the bills.5 This system went on unchecked for years because payers, often employers, demanded
little, if any accountability.
The fee-for-service system survived virtually unchallenged until after World War II. Over time, however, the costs of this
system began to rise considerably and became subject to greater
scrutiny.6 Unfortunately, few incentives existed for physicians
to control costs. 7 The payment structure lacked a cost-control
incentive, and new technology and new drugs accelerated the
rising cost of health care.8
Many observers considered the fee-for-service system to be a
recipe for disaster, given escalating costs, capital-intensive technology, and an aging population. Employers in particular began
to assume a more aggressive posture as a purchaser of health
care, expecting not only accountability but aggressive cost containment strategies. 9 Using classic entrepreneurial creativity,
employers sought alternatives to the costly, fee-for-service system, recognizing the desire to maintain high quality care for
their employees, but also the need to control costs. It was out of
this clear mandate to control costs that the concept of managed
care emerged. 10
For more information on the fee-for-service system and the move to managed care,
see PAUL DEMURO, MANAGED CARE AND INTEGRATED DELIVERY SYSTEMS 1-4
(1995); see also infra notes 32 to 38 and the accompanying text.
4. See Latham, supra note 3, at 400.
5. See id.
6. See Eleanor D. Kinney, ProceduralProtectionsfor Patients in CapitatedHealth
Plans, 22 AM. J. L. & MED. 301, 302-07 (1996) (describing in more detail the rise of
managed care in the face of accelerating health care costs).
7. See Latham, supra note 3, at 400.
8. See Michael E. Chernew, et al., Managed Care, Medical Technology, and Health
Care Cost Growth: A Review of the Evidence, 55 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 259 (1998).
9. While numerous stakeholders would contribute to health care reform efforts,
including physicians, policy makers, regulators and consumers, employers demonstrated unique leadership in promoting change.
10. Managed care is a term to describe a broad set of strategies, including copayments, deductibles, utilization review, prior authorization and gatekeepers, all
designed to contain costs. See Latham, supra note 3, at 400. See also MINN. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, COMMONLY USED HEALTH CARE TERMS GLOSSARY FOR CONSUMERS

(1997) (defining managed care as "a system to integrate the delivery and financing of
comprehensive health care services to covered individuals by means of arrangements
with selected health care providers; explicit criteria for the selection of health-care
providers; significant financial incentives for members to use providers and procedures associated with the plan; and formal programs for quality assurance and utiliza-
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The Health Maintenance Organization ("HMO") became the
most prevalent and aggressive embodiment of managed care
and represented the first true risk-bearing health care delivery
system. 1 By combining health care delivery and financing, the
HMO promised to maintain high quality care while creating in-

centives to control costs. 12 Early proponents of this model suggested that in addition to controlling costs, HMOs would greatly

improve the quality of care by reducing unnecessary, potentially
harmful medical procedures,13 including unnecessary surgery or
excessive drug prescription.

Critics of the HMO model, however, now warn that the very
same incentives designed to control costs either inadvertently or
purposely promote under-utilization, placing patients at risk of
receiving too few services.' 4 Critics today argue that HMOs
have created a system in which health care decisions are not extion review. Providers of managed care include health maintenance organizations
("HMOs") and preferred provider organizations ("PPOs"), as well as traditional insurance companies.").
11. An HMO "takes fixed periodic payment from its enrollees; in return it provides for the financing and delivery of their medical services for a fixed period of
time." See Latham, supra note 3, at 400. There are various kinds of HMOs. Among
the most common are the staff model, the group model, and the Individual Practice
Association ("IPA") model. A staff model HMO directly employs physicians who
provide services to members on an outpatient basis. Staff model physicians are typically paid a salary with bonuses for productivity. A group model HMO is an entity
that contracts with a multi-specialty group of physicians for services for its members.
The physicians are generally paid a fixed amount per patient, and the group divides
the monies between the physicians. The IPA model HMO is similar to a group model.
It contracts with an IPA, which is a group of independent practitioners who see nonHMO patients in addition to HMO patients. The IPA is typically paid by the HMO
on a per patient or capitated basis, and the physicians are reimbursed by the IPA on
either a fee-for-service or capitated basis. Numerous other HMO models exist, and
the entities are often only limited by the creativity of their founders. NATIONAL AsSOC. OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS ("NAIC") WHITE PAPER, THE REGULATION OF
HEALTH RISK-BEARING ErITEs, 1-9 (1997) [hereinafter "NAIC White Paper"]. For
more information about capitation, see infra note 38 and the accompanying text.
12. See Robert T. Holley &. Rick J. Carlson, The Legal Context for the Development of Health Maintenance Organizations,24 STAN. L. REv. 644, 649-53 (1972); see
also Philip C. Kissam & Ronald M. Johnson, Health Maintenance Organizations and
FederalLaw: Toward a Theory of Limited Reformmongering,29 VAND. L. REv. 1163,
1175-78 (describing arguments made by early HMO proponents).
13. See Holley supra note 12.
14. See, e.g., Henry T. Greely, Direct FinancialIncentives in Managed Care: Unanswered Questions, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 53, 69-70 (Winter 1996); see also David Orentlicher, Paying Physicians More to Do Less: FinancialIncentives to Limit Care, 30 U.
RICH. L. REv. 155, 161 (1996); see also Alan L. Hillman, FinancialIncentives for Physicians in HMOs: Is There a Conflict of Interest?, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1743, 174748 (1987) (all of these articles discuss the potential for under-utilization under managed care).
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clusively based on what is in the best interest of the patient, but
are unduly influenced by a corporate balance sheet, resulting in
the rationing of limited resources. 5 Despite the strong reservations held by many about the ethical framework of the HMO
model, its popularity among purchasers is now undeniable. 16
B.

The Need for Next GenerationRisk-Bearing Models

Despite ongoing reservations about the ethical underpinnings
of health care risk-bearing systems, and HMOs in particular, the
rate of increase in health care costs has in fact slowed. 17 Nevertheless, the most recent cost and demographic data suggest a
tentative future. Almost five years after the demise of the Clinton health care reform proposal, the United States maintains the
world's most expensive health care system, outstripping the
health expenditures of all other countries by a significant margin.' 8 In fact, in 1997, the U.S. spent about $4,000 per person on
health care, as compared to the next most expensive country,
Switzerland, which spent approximately $2,500.19 According to
the Health Care Financing Administration ("HCFA"), health
care spending will again begin to grow faster than the rest of the
economy. 20 HCFA predicts that by 2020, health care expenditures will consume 16.6% of the gross domestic product or $2.1
trillion.2 '
Although many factors influence health care spending, advances in medical technology and the aging of the U.S. population are particularly influential. First, some research suggests
that the development and diffusion of medical technology ac15.

See

HMOs AND THE BREAK(1996) (providing numerous examples of HMO "horror

GEORGE ANDERS, HEALTH AGAINST WEALTH:

DOWN OF MEDICAL TRUST

stories" and criticizing the corporate nature of managed care).
16. See Jon Gabel, Ten Ways HMOs Have Changed During the 1990s, HEALTH
AFF., May/June 1997, at 134 (documenting the dramatic increase in the number of
people in managed care plans). For a statistical treatment of the decline of traditional
indemnity insurance, see HEALTH INSURANCE Assoc. OF AMERICA ("HIAA"),
HIAA SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH INSURANCE DATA (1997-1998).
17. See Katherine R. Levit et al., National Health Care Trends in 1996, HEALTH
AFF., Jan./Feb. 1998, at 35 (documenting the dramatic slowdown in health care costs
over the last five years); see also Kenneth E. Thorpe, The Health System in Transition:
Care, Cost, and Coverage, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 339 (1997) (documenting
that the rate of increase in health care costs has declined substantially in recent years).
18. See OECD Health Data1998: A ComparativeAnalysis of 29 Countries, 1998,
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, available in CD-ROM.
19. See id.
20. See Sheila Smith, et al., The Next Ten Years of Health Spending: What Does
the Future Hold?, HEALTH AFF., Sept./Oct. 1998, at 128.
21. See id.
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counts for as much as seventy percent of health care spending
growth since 1960,22 underscoring that while advances in technology have improved and extended human life, they come with
a substantial price.
The second factor is one of demographics, and in particular,
the impact of aging baby boomers. The U.S. population age
sixty-five and over is projected to increase from 12.5% in 1990
to 15.7% in 2020, an increase of over 25%. 23 Equally alarming,
by this same year, the U.S. population age eighty-five and older

is projected to increase from 1.2% in 1990 to 2.1%, an increase
of over 75%. 24 The aging of our population is not a temporary
phenomenon. It is a permanent change in the profile of the
country, and one that will have a profound impact on health
care spending.
Cost and demographic data suggest that the United States will
continue to move away from a fee-for-service system toward
new and evolving managed care risk-sharing arrangements.25
Policy makers recognize that despite mounting consumer skepticism, the system cannot afford to retreat to the fee-for-service

environment.
II.

STATE REGULATION OF HEALTH CARE
RISK-BEARING ENTITIES

A.

What Triggers State Regulation?

State regulators have a keen interest in new and emerging
managed care strategies because of an inherent desire to contribute to the ongoing evolution of the American health care
system. However, it is the transfer or assumption of risk that
truly piques the interest of state regulators, because arrangements involving the transfer or assumption of risk involve the
essential elements of insurancerisk or the business of insurance,
and trigger state regulation.2 6
22. See E.A. Peden & M.S. Freeland, A HistoricalAnalysis of Medical Spending
Growth, 1960-1963, HEALTH AFt., Summer 1995, at 235.
23. See Percent 65 Years and Over and 85 Years and Over Of the Total State Population: 1980 to 2020, HEALTH CARE ALMANAC & Y.B. § A at A68 (1997).
24. See id.
25. See Robert H. Miller & Harold S. Luft, Managed Care Plan PerformanceSince
1980: A Literature Review, 271 JAMA 1512, 1518 (1994) (concluding that HMO enrollment will continue to grow under the current regulatory scheme given the cost and
level of quality currently provided by HMOs).
26. Two schools of thought emerged concerning the regulation of traditional riskbearing entities. Some policy makers argued that HMOs were no different than insur-
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The federal McCarran-Ferguson Act 27 specifies that primary
jurisdiction for the regulation of the business of insurance lies
with the states. In determining whether a particular arrangement is subject to insurance laws, state regulators rely on a variety of sources, including statutes and state and federal court
opinions. In 1982, the United States Supreme Court provided
significant guidance in determining whether an arrangement involves the business of insurance. The Court identified three relevant criteria: (1) whether the activity included the
underwriting or spreading of risk; (2) whether the activity involved an integral part of the insurer-insured relationship; and
(3) whether the activity was limited to entities within the insurance industry. 28 An analysis of these criteria assists in determining whether a particular activity is tantamount to insurance, and
subject to state regulation.
With the explosion of various managed care strategies over
the past decade, the determination of whether an entity is bear-

ing insurance risk has become extremely complex. New and
emerging hybrid risk-bearing entities often rely on complicated
reimbursement schemes, which may or may not include capitation,29 risk adjustment, 30 fee-for-service, withholds, 31 or a combiance companies because they charged monthly premiums and assumed insurance risk
based on actuarial determinations. Therefore, they argued that HMOs should be regulated like insurance companies. Other policy makers, more sensitive to the unique
place health care has in society, argued that public health officials should be involved
in regulating HMOs to ensure that the public receives high quality care. See Holley,
supra note 12, at 656-57 (discussing the implications of state regulation as an obstacle
to the development of HMOs).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1011-1015 (1998).
28. See Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982); see also
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724 (1985). But cf WILLIAM R. VANCE,
THE HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE ( 3 rd

ed. 1951) (listing five elements as

required for an insurance agreement: (1) the insured possesses an insurable interest;
(2) the insured is subject to a risk of loss; (3) the insurer assumes that risk of loss; (4)
the assumption of the risk of loss is part of a general scheme to distribute actual losses
among a large group of persons with similar risks; and (5) the insured pays a premium
to the insurer).
29. For a definition and more explanation of "capitation," see infra note 38 and
accompanying text.
30. Risk adjustment is defined as a process of shifting premium dollars from a
plan with generally healthy enrollees to another with sicker members. Risk adjustment is intended to minimize any financial incentives health plans may have to select
healthier than average enrollees. In a risk adjustment process, those health plans that
attract higher risk members and providers would be compensated for any differences
in the proportion of their members that require higher levels of care as compared to
other plans. AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE POL'Y & RES., GLOSSARY OF QUALrrY OF
CARE TERMS

(1997).
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nation of all of the above. These new hybrid arrangements
cannot be readily evaluated by the same criteria as their predictable predecessors.
Determining the payment structure is the single most important element in evaluating whether a particular entity is bearing
risk.32 Payment methods utilized in a managed care context
vary tremendously. Some involve insurance risk while others
clearly do not. For example, a particular managed care plan
may employ a variety of strategies to contain cost, including
prior authorization,33 utilization review,34 and gatekeeper options,35 but this plan may use a payment method that is directly
linked to the actual delivery of identifiable services to a specific
enrollee. This payment method is therefore a form of fee-forservice 36 and does not involve the transfer of insurance risk.
Another plan may utilize a payment method involving the
prepayment of a premium in exchange for all covered services,
even if those services exceed the amount of the premium. This
method is called "capitation." Capitation has been defined as "a
set dollar payment per patient per unit of time (usually per
month) that an organization pays a physician or physician group
to cover a specified set of services and administrative costs without regard to the actual number of services provided. ' ' 37 A plan
using a capitated payment method involves the essential elements of insurance risk and triggers state regulation.38
The proliferation of new and emerging hybrid risk-bearing entities, together with an increasing level of consumer skepticism,
requires state regulators to consider how to most appropriately
31. "Withhold pools" are arrangements whereby providers assume partial insurance risk. To fund withhold pools, part of a provider's payment is put into a pool, and
this money is used if the cost of services delivered exceeds a pre-arranged budget. See
NAIC White Paper, supra note 11, at 1-14. The NAIC has said that a "withhold pool"
compensation arrangement may or may not constitute insurance. Depending on the
arrangement, the providers may be responsible for specialty referrals and therefore
may be spreading risk in an area where they have no control. In such a case, the
provider would likely be assuming insurance risk because of lack of control of the
risk.
32. See NAIC White Paper, supra note 11, at 1-12.
33. See generally Barry R. Furrow, Managed Care Organizationsand Patient Injury: Rethinking Liability, 31 GA. L. REv. 419 (1997) (discussing managed care cost
containment techniques).
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See supra note 3 and accompanying text for more explanation of fee-forservice.
37. 42 C.F.R. § 417.479(c) (1998).
38. See NAIC White Paper, supra note 11, at 1-14.
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modify the current regulatory structure to accommodate this
changing environment. In re-evaluating the fundamental regulatory framework that state regulators have relied upon for
years, protecting consumers and promoting market competition
must remain the highest priority.
B.

The Cost of Regulation

The primary objectives of state health insurance regulation
are protecting consumers against insolvency while, at the same
time, promoting market competition. Unfortunately, these two
objectives are often in direct conflict. Consumer protection regulation does not come without costs, and these costs are often
real barriers to doing business in the health care market. For
instance, in Minnesota, risk-bearing health care entities must
satisfy numerous consumer protection regulations and comply
with reporting, oversight, reserve, capital and surplus requirements. 39 Satisfying these requirements can be costly and promote, at least implicitly, economies of scale. Even if a smaller,
less capitalized entity can satisfy the initial capital requirements,
administrative and data collection regulations require substantial and ongoing financial resources. Assuming equal efficiency
in other areas of business, a larger entity will be more efficient
and create a lower per capita regulatory cost as compared to a
smaller entity.4 ° Thus, regulation, to a certain extent, promotes
consolidation. While consolidation may offer lower costs, expanded provider networks, and increased consumer protection
from insolvency, these benefits may be offset by consumer concerns about reduced innovation, reduced competition, and homogeneity of plans offered.41
The public's suspicions of a highly consolidated health care
market should not be underestimated in its impact on public
39.

See MINN. DEPr. OF COMMERCE ("MDC") & MDH, JOINT FINAL REPORT TO
Feb. 1997,
at 12 [hereinafter "Minn. Report"]; see also Kent G. Rutter, Democratizing HMO
Regulation to Enforce the "Rule of Rescue," 30 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 147, 163 n.100
(1996) (indicating that Minnesota's HMO regulations, like that of 27 other states, are
patterned after the MHO Model Act, adopted by the NAIC in 1973).
40. See generally Edward Hirshfeld, Interpretingthe 1996 FederalAntitrust Guidelines for Physician Joint Venture Networks, 6 ANNALS HEALTH L. 1, 33-49 (1997) (analyzing regulatory costs and administrative efficiencies in the context of legal joint
ventures by physicians).
41. See James D. Rusin, Reality Check, Please: Suggestions for Change in Health
Care Delivery, MINN. PHYSICIAN, Feb. 1997, at 32 (describing the negative aspects of a
consolidated health care market in Minnesota).
THE LEGISLATURE, DIRECT CONTRACnNG FOR HEALTH CARE SERVICES,
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policy. The public's distrust of large HMOs is undeniably playing a role in elected officials' desire to "correct" the system.
Candidates for public office and their accomplices in the media
have contributed to public fears and bias against large, dominant HMOs by recounting numerous testimonials involving individuals who were purportedly denied access to care or
prohibited from seeing the provider of their choice.42
Elected officials face intense pressure from a variety of different constituencies. The public demands greater protections
from abuse and limitations on health care choices; employers
cry out against rising costs; and HMOs complain of an increasingly burdensome regulatory framework, in which the list of
mandated benefits seems to increase whenever the legislature is
in session. In addition, physicians seek the freedom necessary to
simply practice medicine without micro-management from corporate executives or inflexible government officials. These
multi-focal pressures contribute to the ongoing evolution of the
U.S. health care system.
III.

MINNESOTA REGULATION OF HEALTH

RISK-BEARING ENTITIES

TraditionalHealth Maintenance Organizations
Minnesota law makes it clear that because an HMO assumes
insurance risk, it is in the business of insurance. Therefore, it is
subject to state regulation. HMO regulations address a myriad
of issues, including licensing, net worth and working capital requirements, financial standards, geographic accessibility, governing body requirements, quality assurance requirements,
annual reporting requirements, fees, complaint systems, benefits, claims practices, and other reporting requirements.43
Although the Minnesota Department of Commerce regulates
most insurance, the Department of Health has regulatory responsibility over HMOs. 4
By placing HMO regulation in the Department of Health, the
state legislature has sent a strong message that the delivery and
A.

42. Minnesota's new Attorney General, Mike Hatch, for example, campaigned
heavily on HMO reform citing numerous examples of treatment denials. Hatch has
proposed a litany of reforms. See Mike Hatch Press Release (June 24, 1998) on file
with author; see also Glenn Howatt & Dane Smith, Hatch Renews Fight for HMO
Patients, Mn'NEAPOLIS STAR-TRIB., Feb. 6, 1999, at B1; supra note 1 (for more articles
negatively portraying HMOs and managed care).
43. See MINN. STAT. § 62D et seq. (1998).
44. See id.
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regulation of health care services, including health care riskbearing entities, require expertise found only in a public health
agency. Further, while most states have enacted consumer protection regulations, Minnesota is the only state to require all
HMOs to be non-profit entities, and to carefully monitor and
regulate HMO surplus revenue. 45 By prohibiting for-profit
HMOs, Minnesota has made a strong statement about the financing and delivery of health care and voiced its collective opposition to exposing consumers to a profit motive when it comes
to health care. 46
B.

Community Integrated Service Networks

An early outgrowth of Minnesota's health care reform legislation, known as MinnesotaCare, is embodied in Minnesota Statutes Section 62, which allows for the creation of CommunityIntegrated Service Networks ("CISNs").4 7 The purpose behind
CISNs was to enable smaller rural communities to develop their
own provider networks capable of delivering a broad range of
prepaid health care services to their members. CISNs would
serve smaller populations and provide services that were more
appropriately shaped to meet the specific needs of the local
community. To ensure that the needs of the local community
were a priority for the CISN, the state legislature mandated that
at least fifty-one percent of the governing body's members be
residents of the CISN's service area. The theory behind this requirement was that individuals who were familiar with the needs
of the local community would also receive services from the
CISN and be encouraged to contribute to the total health care
of the community. Additionally, by ensuring local control over
45. See MINN. STAT. § 62D.02, Subd. 4. (a) (1998).
46. It is unclear what the implications are for only allowing non-profit HMOs in
the state. Some have argued that not having for-profit HMOs has somewhat ironically only exacerbated the public's complaints about managed care; that is, by only
allowing non-profit HMOs in the state, Minnesota has actually promoted consolidation and decreased choice. See Rusin, supra note 41 (considering that for-profit
HMOs in the state would reintroduce market competition). But cf. Amy Phenix, The
Nonprofit Mission: Allina Defends Its Role in Providing Community Benefit, MINN.
PHYSICIAN, Mar. 1997, at 24 (arguing that non-profits are able to take a long-term
view on health issues by not facing the scrutiny of short-term oriented shareholders
and that non-profits are able to invest in the community through their foundations).
47. Legislation to reform Minnesota's health care system was first passed in 1991,
but was vetoed by then Governor Arne H. Carlson. In 1992, a bipartisan group of
legislators, referred to as the "Gang of 7," worked with Governor Carlson to develop
a comprehensive health care reform bill known as MinnesotaCare, which was subsequently adopted (materials on file with author).
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CISNs, fewer health care decisions would be made away from
the community by individuals who were unaware of local needs.
Theoretically, CISNs represented an attractive option for rural
areas that lacked a sufficient number of providers and patients
to develop large integrated delivery systems.
Since CISNs were developed as an alternativefor smaller rural
communities, Minnesota lawmakers were interested in developing an alternative regulatory structure to the HMO statute, considered by many to be overly burdensome. Such an alternative
regulatory structure never truly materialized. While CISNs
were offered some administrative flexibility to meet licensure
and quality standards, regulatory requirements were not appreciably different and were actually viewed by many as an insurmountable barrier to the implementation of this particular
model.48
It became clear over time that the CISN theory would not
provide the practical alternative that lawmakers had hoped.
Only four entities were ever awarded CISN licenses, and only
one of those, as of this writing, remains a CISN. 49 Many providers rejected the CISN concept, citing its complex and overly burdensome regulatory scheme and arguing that the intent of the
CISN concept had been lost in the drafting of laws by which it
was to be governed. 50
The laudable theory whereby rural Minnesota would develop
smaller integrated networks to serve the needs of a community
translated into an unattainable goal. The development of the
CISN concept represents a textbook example of policymakers'
genuine desire to develop an alternative to what was considered
by many to be large dispassionate oligopolies. This desire
seemed reasonable, yet it was eventually overpowered by a collective unwillingness to accept any regulatory scheme that did
not embody the consumer protection standards set forth in existing law.5 '
48. See infra Appendix A (MDH spreadsheet comparing the regulatory requirement of different health care risk-bearing entities).
49. See Interview with Tom Johnson, Health Care Analyst of the Managed Care
Section of MDH, (November 24, 1998) (materials on file with author).
50. Materials on file with author.
51. Regulatory requirements for CISNs included the provision of prepaid health
services to 50,000 or fewer enrollees; mandatory participation in publicly funded programs; compliance with HMO statutes and rules with some minor exceptions; 51% of
governing board residents of CISN service area; compliance with HMO benefits set;
compliance with HMO deposit requirements. See infra Appendix A.
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CONTRACTING STRATEGIES

The health care market, both nationally and in Minnesota, has
been in a period of rapid and dramatic change in recent years.
To best cope with the changing marketplace, public and private
purchasers of health care services have actively pursued new
purchasing strategies, including the formation of direct contracting arrangements. "Direct contracting" refers to a contract
for health care services offered by a provider-sponsored organization ("PSO") 52 typically to an employer or group of employers. The PSO accepts full or partial risk for utilization of health
care services above the anticipated level.5 3 This type of arrangement is in contrast to the typical situation where an employer
purchases health care coverage from an insurer or from a health
plan such as an HMO or Blue Cross/Blue Shield, or where the
health care coverage is provided by a self-insured employer on a
fee-for-service basis.
The question of whether direct contracting arrangements
should be, as a matter of public policy, recognized as an acceptable alternative model for delivering health care services has
been the subject of much debate at both the state and federal
level. 4 An examination of the advantages and disadvantages of
direct contracting arrangements is instructive.
Many providers consider direct contracting arrangements to
be an attractive alternative to participation in an HMO or indemnity insurance plan, because the structure is thought to afford greater autonomy in the practice of medicine. 5 Further,
providers suggest that an arrangement in which the provider has
primary responsibility for both cost and quality will produce a
52. For purposes of this Article, the term "PSO" refers to a variety of providercentered health care entities that seek to assume risk directly. Such entities could
include Provider Hospital Organizations ("PHOs"), Preferred Provider Organizations
("PPOs"), and Independent Practice Associations ("IPAs").
53. See Minn. Report, supra note 39, at 2.
54. The direct contracting/PSO debate spurred the development of the NAIC
White Paper and the Minnesota Report. See NAIC White Paper, supra note 11; see
also Minn. Report, supra note 39.
55. See, e.g., Glenn Howatt, Physicians Form Own Health Plan. MINNEAPOLIS
STAR-TRIB., Nov. 25, 1998, at Bi; see also Brian O'Reilly, Taking on the HMOs, FORTUNE MAG., Feb. 16, 1998, at 96, 100; Judith Yates Borger, Eliminating the Middleman, ST. PAUL PIONEER-PRESS, Aug. 27, 1997, at Bi; see also Edward B. Hirshfeld,
Provider Sponsored Organizationsand ProviderService Networks-Rationale and Regulation, 22 AM. J. L. & MED. 263, 272-93 (1996) (arguing why providers can be more

efficient deliverers of health care and why public policies should promote and facilitate the formation of entities in which providers assume insurance risk).
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more efficient and effective health care delivery system. 6
Under such arrangements, the risk is placed in the hands of
providers, who are most able to assess and influence cost and
quality.
Proponents of direct contracting suggest that when health
care is purchased from large integrated health plans, individual
providers are not held accountable for the quality of care or the
cost of such care. Alternatively, direct contracting arrangements, as opposed to large plans, result in competition among
providers and require that providers be accountable for both the
cost and quality of the care they provide. In other words, if
providers have autonomy and a financial incentive, they will
provide the appropriate level of care in the most cost-effective
manner without diluting quality. 7 Other advantages of direct
contracting include the potential to help counter trends toward
consolidation in the health care market, presumably because
smaller provider groups will be able to enter the market and
58
create more competition at both the plan and provider level.
This type of market diversification could theoretically result in
increased choice of providers and decreased costs to consumers.
Although the theory of direct contracting certainly has some
intellectual (and emotional) appeal, serious questions remain
about the practical application of this alternative model, particularly in a health care system that historically has emphasized
consumer protection as a primary objective. 59 Critics argue that
enrollee access to comprehensive care will be diminished because it is unlikely that smaller provider groups will have all necessary specialties represented within the group, or have
adequate geographic availability of all provider types.60 The issue of access as it relates to direct contracting arrangements may
have added significance in rural, less populated areas where
consumers are currently under-served. Additionally, enrollees
in direct contracting arrangements may be more vulnerable in
the areas of quality control, utilization review, marketing and
disclosure, and appeal rights, to the extent that these arrangements fall outside the state regulatory structure.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

See
See
See
See
See

Hirshfeld, supra note 55, at 272.
id.
Minn. Report, supra note 39, at 3-4.
id. at 1.
id. at 4-5.
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Perhaps the most significant concern raised about direct contracting arrangements, however, and the one that has continually blocked their acceptance in the market, relates to financial
sustainability and the risk of enrollee coverage termination due
to provider insolvency. 6' Regulators are concerned that groups
of providers that have no experience or expertise in assuming
insurance risk may underestimate the assets required to prevent
insolvency. Furthermore, because the size and assets of the provider group are likely to be relatively small, the number of high
cost cases needed to cause insolvency will be fewer, thereby increasing the risk to consumers.
Despite a number of valid concerns, developments at both the
state and federal level reflect an ongoing interest in promoting
the development of direct contracting arrangements. Elected
officials will likely continue to pursue this alternative risk-bearing strategy in an effort to improve quality, decrease cost, and
preserve the physician/patient relationship.
V.

MINNESOTA's EXPERIENCE wiTH DIREcr
CONTRACTING ARRANGEMENTS

Advocates for direct contracting in Minnesota refer to themselves as "Mainstreeters" and market an idea that no rational
elected official can oppose. They advocate that direct contracting arrangements will bring back "viable, community-focused options for providers and small businesses. '62 Because
the rhetoric is so appealing, Minnesota lawmakers have actively
promoted direct contracting through legislation in recent
years.63 In doing so, the legislature has moved in two seemingly
opposite directions to "reform" the health care system. Specifically, in 1997, the Minnesota legislature passed, by a substantial
61. See id.
62. Elisabeth Quam Berne, Directing the Contract: Independent Providers and
Small Businesses Get in on the Action, MINN. PHYSICIAN, Feb. 1998, at 32; see also
Ken Heithoff et al., Health Care on Main Street: New Solutions for Community-Based
Care, MINN.PHYSICIAN, May 1997, at 26 (both articles arguing in support of the APN
legislation).
63. A 1995 MinnesotaCare amendment specifically authorized a demonstration
project of direct contracting between a certain provider cooperative and qualified employers or self-insured employer plans. The law requires that the provider cooperative notify the MDH upon entering into a contract with a self-insured employer. Two
additional pilot projects were authorized by the 1996 Legislature, and while all three
of these provider co-ops are located in southwestern Minnesota, none is currently
contracting with -employers. See MINN. DEP'T HEALTH, DIRECT CONTRACTING,
HEALTH ECONOMICS PROGRAM ISSUE PAPER (1996).
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margin, a consumer protection bill known as the Patient Protection Act ("PPA"), purportedly because existing HMO laws did
not adequately protect the rights of health care consumers.'
The PPA prohibits certain types of provider contracts that limit
the free exchange of information between the provider and the
patient. It also prohibits exclusive arrangements and retaliation
by a health plan against a provider.65 Additionally, the PPA
mandates that a health plan must disclose to a consumer the
general nature of the reimbursement methodology used to pay
providers.66 The Patient Protection Act applies to all regulated
health plans.67
Within days of the passage of the PPA, Minnesota lawmakers
introduced legislation that would allow for the assumption of insurance risk by unlicensed providers.68 The legislation provided
for Accountable Provider Networks ("APNs") and created an
option for providers, particularly small rural providers, to be directly involved in the delivery and financing of health care.69
The bill, as originally drafted, allowed APNs to exercise substantial autonomy, provided unprecedented flexibility, and streamlined many of the consumer protections that exist in licensed
health plan regulations. Though the bill eventually became law,
it was stripped of nearly all the provisions that made it look and
feel appreciably different from the existing regulatory structure,
especially those provisions relating to capital requirements and
ongoing reserve requirements. During key legislative hearings,
regulators convinced lawmakers that if risk was to be transferred under an APN model, the consumer protection laws that
the legislature had reaffirmed only days earlier should not be
compromised.7 °
Considerable pressure by special interests made the APN legislation a reality,71 but despite this pressure and fanfare, as of
the date of this writing, only one group has applied for an APN
license, and this group differs from the kind promoted as most
likely to benefit from the legislation.72 Providers do not view
MiNN. STAT. § 62J (1998).
id.
id.
id.
MiNN. STAT. §§ 62N, 62T (1998).
69. See MiNN. STAT. § 62T (1998).
70. Materials on file with author.
71. See, e.g., Berne, supra note 62; see also Heithoff, supra note 62.
72. See Johnson Interview, supra note 49. A review of the only APN application
the state has received indicates that the APN is an urban and suburban provider

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See
See
See
See
See
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the APN legislation as an attractive alternative, since it is not
appreciably different than existing law.73 The APN legislative
battle underscores the challenge of introducing new alternatives
into a market that is unwilling to accept any compromises in
consumer protection regulations for an opportunity to enhance
market competition.
VI.

REFLECTIONS ON MINNESOTA'S RECORD OF
MIXED SUCCESS

There are a number of possible explanations for the failure of
CISNs and APNs to become the popular alternative to the

highly consolidated market in Minnesota. A comparison of the
regulatory schemes under which HMOs, CISNs, and APNs are
governed is particularly enlightening.74 As Appendix A makes
clear, there is very little difference between an HMO, CISN, and

APN in terms of regulatory requirements. HMOs, CISNs, and
APNs must all be licensed by the Commissioner of Health. The
deposit, net worth and capital requirements are the same for
HMOs, CISNs, and APNs, unless the APN is granted a waiver
from the Commissioner of Health.75 The required financial
standards and geographic accessibility is the same for HMOs,
CISNs, and APNs; the required annual reporting requirements
and quality assurance requirements are also essentially the
same.
One reason for this lack of distinction between the three
health care risk-bearing models is presumably because the state
legislature is unwilling to compromise consumer protections and
views the HMO regulatory structure as a baseline that should
apply to all health care risk-bearing entities, regardless of form.
This philosophy is likely rooted in principles of basic equity.
group created with the intention of competing directly with HMOs. Thus, the group
differs from the model put forth by early supporters of the legislation that suggested
that APNs would allow small town doctors to band together to offer capitated services. (The lone APN application is public information and is on file with author.)
73. See infra Appendix A.
74. See infra Appendix A.
75. The waiver language, which was amended on to the bill in an attempt to maintain even modest distinctions from HMOs, allows for some flexibility in regulatory
compliance and was created to satisfy the concerns of some APN proponents. No one
has applied for the waiver, and the criteria is quite rigorous. An entity seeking a
waiver must satisfy each of the following criteria: (1) more choice in benefits and
prices; (2) lower costs; (3) increased access to health coverage by small businesses; (4)
increased access to providers who have demonstrated a long-term commitment to the
community being serviced; and (5) increased quality of health care than otherwise
occur under the existing market conditions. See MINN. STAT. § 62T (1998).
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Consumers expect certain minimum standards irrespective of
the manner in which they access the health care system. Based
on the plain and unambiguous language embodied in current
regulations, it is clear that the legislature is unwilling to compromise baseline consumer protection standards in order to promote new, fairly untested risk-bearing entities.76
VII.

NEW AND EMERGING DiREcr

CONTRAC-TING ARRANGEMENTS

Although direct contracting arrangements, at least in Minnesota, still face significant challenges, there are opportunities in
which these arrangements can thrive both outside and within the
Minnesota regulatory framework. These new arrangements
challenge state regulators to carefully balance the need to protect consumers with the desire to encourage market diversification through alternative risk-bearing models.
A. "Downstream Risk" Arrangements
One of the ways in which provider groups have taken on additional risk and autonomy is by assuming what is known as
"downstream risk." Downstream risk arises when a provider-

centered organization contracts with a licensed entity and assumes part of the licensed entity's insurance risk.77 While provider groups engaged in downstream risk have been examined
by some states, the assumption of downstream risk should not
necessarily trigger the need for serious state regulation of pro-

vider groups.78 The HMO or other licensed entity involved in
the contract is already required to comply with state insurance
regulations and, therefore, the provider group is "downstream"
from the actual insurance risk. 79 Thus, the consumer is protected by having a relationship with at least one regulated
80
entity.
Downstream risk contracting opportunities provide a realistic,
tangible way for providers to assume additional risk and financial control, yet not be directly subject to rigorous state
regulation.
76. See James S. Matthews, A Modest Proposal:An Alternative to Insurance Regulation of Direct Contracts, MINN. PHYscIAN, Sept. 1997, at 32 (arguing that Minnesota
PSOs be given special regulatory consideration).
77. See NAIC White Paper, supra note 11, at 1-24, 1-25.
78. See id. at 1-29.
79. See id.
80. See id.
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Direct Contracting with Employers

Employers assert that contracting directly with providers can
be an effective cost containment alternative. Nevertheless, Minnesota regulators have clearly stated that direct contracting between PSOs and employers, where the PSO assumes risk, is the
business of insurance and will be regulated by the state to protect the public. A key, but unresolved, question is at what level
of risk-sharing should the state impose regulation. "It remains
to be clarified whether a PSO that assumes any amount of risk
will be considered to be in the business of insurance, or whether
there is somea threshold level of risk-sharing that will require
regulation."'
Provider groups can avoid state regulation entirely by falling
into the ERISA exemption 8 2 which prohibits states from regulating the health care benefits of self-insured employers.83 In
Minnesota, the biggest and best known experiment in direct
contracting under the ERISA exemption is the Buyer's Health
Care Action Group ("BHCAG").84 BHCAG is a coalition of
some of the largest employers in the state of Minnesota, including such well-known names as Cargill, 3M, Honeywell, DaytonHudson, and Pillsbury. BHCAG-member employers offer an
employer-sponsored health plan known as ChoicePlus to approximately 250,000 eligible covered lives.85 Under a direct contracting approach that began in 1997, BHCAG created an
internal health care market where consumers choose among
competing care systems. A care system is an integrated team of
providers including hospitals, specialty groups, and primary care
physicians. Primary care providers participate in only one care
system within ChoicePlus, and each care system determines its
own network of providers.86 To establish premiums, the care
81. See Minn. Report, supra note 39, at 27.
82. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (a) (1998).
83. Analysis of PSOs under ERISA is a complex issue outside the scope of this
article. For an analysis on this subject, see for example, Margaret G. Farrell, ERISA
Preemption and Regulation of Managed Care: The Case for Managed Federalism, 23
AM. J. L. & MED. 251, 252 (1997); see also Allison Overbay & Mark Hall, Insurance
Regulation of Providers that Bear Risk, 22 AM. J. L. & MED. 361, 378-82 (1996).
84. See Ann L. Robinow, The Buyers Health CareAction Group: Creatinga Competitive Care System Model, 5 MANAGED CARE Q. 61 (1997).
85. See BHCAG Benefits Plan, Marketing Literature, and ChoicePlus Performance Results (materials on file with author).
86. See Robinow, supra note 84, at 63.
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systems submit targets.87 Based on their targets, BHCAG rates
each care system, and each is placed into a premium category:
high, medium, or low cost. Providers prefer this method because it allows the network to retain some autonomy in pricing
and creates incentives for self-policing and internal management
as opposed to extensive outside cost-containment pressures.
Based on the care systems' stated targets, employees choose
their care system and decide how much they want to spend on
health care. The health benefit set is the same for all care systems.88 BHCAG provides employees with an array of comparative information, allowing employees to make informed choices
about a care system. BHCAG argues that this system allows for
active consumer participation in which individuals consciously
choose
their plan based on information related to cost and
89
care.

Because the employers in BHCAG are currently deemed selfinsured, the care systems are outside state regulation. 90 The
care systems, therefore, are not required to comply with reserve
requirements or state reporting requirements. 91
Thus, the BHCAG system relies on a sophisticated quality rating system and competition between care systems. Its provider
reimbursement scheme is quite complex.92 The BHCAG model
has been viewed by many as a success, and costs within that system have been lower than comparable costs by local HMOs, satisfying employers.93
87. Setting targets for premiums has become increasingly accurate by the use of
technology, including ambulatory care groups (ACGs). For a discussion of ACGs and
BHCAG's use of technology, see Brent A. Metfessel, Advances in Risk Adjustment:
Leveling the Playing Field in Provider Profiling, MINN. PHYsIcIAN, Apr. 1997, at 26.
88. See Robinow, supra note 84.
89. See id.
90. Despite BHCAG's apparent immunity to state regulation based on the
ERISA exemption, HMOs have put pressure on state government to regulate BHCAG to put it on a level playing field with HMOs. See Tom Majeski, Self-funded
Plans Fear State Regulation Consumer-ProtectionBills Set Health Groups Squabbling,
ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Mar. 4, 1997, at 3B.
91. See Minn. Report, supra note 39, at 6.
92. For a detailed look at BHCAG's reimbursement scheme, see Allan Baumgarten, The Minnesota Experiment; Buyers Health Care Action Group BHCAG Conducts Market Study in Minneapolis/St. Paul Minnesota, Bus. & HEALTH, July 1996, at
24.
93. For statistics on BHCAG's costs, see Glenn Howatt, BHCAG Expects Relatively Small 1999 Price Increase, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIB., July 24, 1998, at B2; see
also John Manning, BHCAG Budgets Rise More Slowly, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL CirvaTus, July 24, 1998, at 4.
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Though reports suggest that this model has had success in
containing costs while maintaining quality, the applicability of
the BHCAG model is likely limited. Minnesota regulators have
made clear that even though the BHCAG provider reimbursement system clearly involves the transfer of some risk, they have
not defined this program as insurance for two primary reasons.
First, the risk adjustment methodology in the plan provides
some assurance that the care systems will not inadvertently assume more risk than they are capable of covering. Second, and
more significantly, the Minnesota Departments of Health and
Commerce have refrained from regulating and instead monitor
BHCAG because they are confident that companies such as
Cargill, 3M, and Dayton-Hudson will continue to provide for
their employees even if one of the care systems becomes insolvent. State regulators are unlikely to have similar confidence in
Mom & Pop's Groceries or the local pizzeria. Thus, although
the BHCAG model has been held out as a potential national
model for how costs can be controlled by promoting provider
competition, its application may be limited. The BHCAG
model is likely not appropriate for (1) small employers, who
cannot be relied upon to financially support failed care systems;
(2) high risk populations, where costs are difficult to estimate;
and (3) rural areas, where care system competition is limited by
a limited number of providers.
Nevertheless, Minnesota's regulatory response to the BHCAG model should be commended because it looked beyond
the strict theoretical application of insurance law and considered, from a practical perspective, the actual exposure to consumers receiving health care services in a system that clearly
represents a creative alternative to the existing framework.
C. Direct Contractingin Government Health Programs

The growth and development of direct contracting arrangements is not limited to the private health care market. These
arrangements have also gained popularity in serving populations
receiving health care through government-sponsored
programs. 94

94. The federal government, as the sponsor of Medicare and Medicaid programs,
represents this country's single largest health care customer. As part of the Balanced
Budget Act of 1997, major changes were made to Medicare, including the development of the Medicare+Choice plan. Under the Medicare+Choice plan, consumers on
Medicare can receive their benefits from an approved managed care entity. Congress
believed that this plan would encourage more Medicare recipients to use managed
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The state of Minnesota has expanded the direct contracting

theory through its application to government sponsored health
plans. This strategy, known as County-Based Purchasing
("CBP"), gives Minnesota counties the option of taking control
of the purchasing

recipients.95

of health care services

for Medicaid

CBP arose out of discussions that began in the early 1980s,

when the Minnesota Department of Human Services ("DHS")
began working with three Minnesota counties as demonstration
projects for the implementation of the Prepaid Medical Assistance Program ("PMAP"). PMAP enables the DHS to enter

into contracts with health plan companies to provide services to
care plans, and therefore the costs of the Medicare, which have been skyrocketing,
would be controlled. While some commentators have questioned the wisdom of pursuing managed care for Medicare recipients, Congress appears convinced that what is
good for the private sector is good for the public sector. As part of Medicare+Choice,
certain PSOs may qualify to compete for Medicare business. To qualify as a Medicare
PSO, the PSO must meet state HMO requirements or apply for a waiver. The federal waiver process allows PSOs to contract for Medicare business without satisfying a
state's HMO requirements. A waiver is possible if a PSO is unable to receive a state
license; however, the recent regulations promulgated on Medicare PSOs appear at
least as rigorous and probably more confusing than any state requirements. At least
in part due to the confusing regulations, the Health Care Financing Administration
("HCFA") only received three Medicare PSO applications in the first year. See Milt
Freudenheim, So Far, 'Medicare Plus Choice' is Minus Most of the Options, N. Y.
TIMES, Oct. 4, 1998, § 3, at 1; Medicare: HCFA Receives Only Three Applications for
New Medicare+Choice Options, HEALTH CARE POL'Y REP. (BNA) No. 1392, (Aug.
31, 1998); Doreen A. Mohs, A New Take on Medicare Contracting: Provider-Sponsored OrganizationsCan Now Compete for Business, MINN. PHYsIcIAN, Oct. 1997, at
34 (all discussing the problems associated with Medicare direct contracting). Thus,
the development of Medicare PSOs faces the same problems as APNs in the state of
Minnesota. Congress, like the Minnesota legislature, wants to promote new health
care entities and empower providers; however, Congress, like the Minnesota legislature, is unwilling to compromise consumer protection for a new, untested entity. Not
only are the regulations confusing and cumbersome, would-be Medicare PSOs are
well aware that HMOs are fleeing the Medicare market in droves because of an inability to make money under increasingly scrutinizing reimbursement schedules. See
Glenn Howatt, Cuts to Medicare HMOs Put Strain on Senior Citizens, MINNEAPOLIS
STAR-TRIB., Nov. 1, 1998, at B1. As many as 200,000 elderly will be dropped from
HMOs this year because of changes in the law. See id. Nevertheless, despite all the
problems, the Medicare market remains a substantial market, and in the years to
come, direct contracting with the federal government will be a trend to watch.
95. Medicaid is a federally aided, state-administered program providing medical
benefits for some indigent or low-income persons. The program is authorized by Title
XII of the Social Security Act and covers only those individuals who meet certain
eligibility criteria. Subject to federal guidelines, states determine covered benefits,
program eligibility, payment rates for providers, and the methods of administering the
program. In Minnesota, Medicaid is also called Medical Assistance. See MINN. DEP'T
OF HEALTH, COMMONLY USED HEALTH CARE TERMS GLOSSARY FOR CONSUMERS,

(1996).
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eligible Medicaid recipients. The services are provided on a
capitated basis, with the contractual relationship existing between the DHS and the licensed health plan. By 1993, PMAP
was expanded to Ramsey County, the second largest Minnesota
county. It was during this transition that counties began identifying substantial cost shifting of health care services from licensed health plans to county government.96 Specifically,
county government was concerned that while it had an ever-increasing level of responsibility to provide health services to the
Medicaid populations, it had no authority to influence the delivery and financing of health care services, because the PMAP
contract was exclusively between the licensed health plan and
the state.97
In response to this growing concern, the Minnesota legislature
enacted CBP. The legislature noted that counties should have
the opportunity to directly operate a purchasing system for the
health care of families, children and the elderly in the Medical
Assistance program. 98 CBP represents a complex relationship
between county, state, and federal government, whereby a
county or group of counties purchase and/or provide health care
services on behalf of persons eligible for Medicaid. Similar to
health plans under PMAP, counties are paid by the DHS on a
capitated basis. Counties involved in CBP must ensure that enrollees have access to covered services and a reasonable choice
of providers. Counties are free to manage their programs and
negotiate with providers. If the costs of providing care to Medicaid recipients surpass prepaid funding by the state, the county,
and not the state or federal government, is responsible for any
shortfall, similar to a licensed health plan providing services on a
capitated basis. Counties are, therefore, encouraged to take
steps to limit insurance risk through various means, including
stop-loss coverage or reinsurance. 99
Counties that participate in CBP are not required to obtain a
certificate of authority from the Minnesota Department of
96. In Ramsey County alone, the financial impact was approximately $600,000 in
the first year of implementation. See Ramsey County Human Services Department
documents (materials on file with author).
97. Materials on file with author.

98. Thomas Moss, AMC-DHS-MDH AGREEMENT, AN INTERNAL AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE ASSOCIATION OF MINNESOTA COUNTIES ("AMC"), DHS, and MDH,
(1996) [hereinafter "AMC-DHS-MDH Agreement"].
99. See id.; see also MINN. DEP'T OF HEALTH, MINNESOTA

HEALTH CARE MAR-

(1995) (defining re-insurance as "the resale of insurance products to a
secondary market thereby spreading the costs associated with underwriting").
KET REPORT,
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Health, as a private health plan is, but are still required to meet
all consumer protection regulations through a contract with the
DHS. 10 0 State regulators support this arrangement even though
counties are clearly assuming the same risk as a licensed health
plan. If a county fails to comply with any of the consumer protection regulations required of licensed health plans, DHS has
the authority to terminate the contract and reinstate PMAP. 01 1
Ramsey County chose to pursue CBP, citing a number of advantages, including: (1) the county has the authority to negotiate and manage contracts with providers; (2) in the event that a
care system denies services, the county will be more effective in
negotiating resolutions because it has a legally recognized relationship with the providers; (3) county management is more sensitive to specific county issues than a licensed health plan; and
(4) the county will more effectively manage any excess revenue
or interest for the benefit of county taxpayers. 2
While this new heightened level of autonomy has its advantages, CBP faces some criticism. Critics argue that it is highly
unlikely that this system will result in cost savings, noting that
county government lacks the requisite level of sophistication to
effectively manage a capitated health plan.10 3 Furthermore, critics are concerned that the management of such a plan will be
especially difficult in light of unique utilization challenges associated with the Medicaid population. 10 4
The implementation of CBP is a work in progress and requires a certain level of regulatory discretion. For example,
state regulators recognized that had they demanded compliance
with the rules governing licensed health plans, particularly those
governing capital requirements, few, if any counties could realistically participate. Regulators also recognized that a legally
binding contract between the DHS and the county would be as
effective in protecting consumers as the license that is required
of a health plan. Finally, regulators acknowledged that CBP
could provide invaluable information about the delivery of
100. See AMC-DHS-MDH Agreement.
101. Under county-based purchasing, a county may elect to contract directly with
providers, licensed health plans, or a variety of both. The county also has the authority to utilize any reasonable reimbursement method. It is the county, however, that
maintains responsibility for the implementation of the delivery system and for any
excess costs associated with county-based purchasing. See AMC-DHS-MDH
Agreement.
102. See Ramsey County Documents, supra note 96.
103. Materials on file with author.
104. See id.
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health care using a non-traditional strategy (namely, CBP), with
non-traditional partners (namely, counties), that would undoubtedly help shape future health policy.
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE MINNESOTA EXPERIENCE

The Minnesota experience in regulating risk in a managed
care environment can be reduced into several guiding principles.
First, risk regulation must be commensurate with real and appreciable exposure. The BHCAG experience is instructive. Despite the fact that BHCAG's plan clearly involves the transfer of
some risk, the state chose not to exert regulatory authority. Instead, regulators are monitoring and evaluating this direct contracting model, recognizing primarily that consumers are not at
risk because of the size and financial resources of the BHCAG
employer group.
Second, ongoing tension will continue to exist between protecting consumers and promoting a competitive marketplace.
Until expectations of the health care system change, the primary
objective of state regulators must be to protect consumers
against insolvency.
Third, the regulatory framework among risk-bearing entities
should foster a level playing field. In other words, form should
follow function.
Fourth, state regulators must use discretion in evaluating new
risk-bearing strategies, thoughtfully using the law as opposed to
robotically applying it.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, for innovation to occur
in the health care marketplace, everyone, including health plans,
consumers, policy makers and regulators, must allow for compromise and flexibility. If compromise and flexibility are not attainable, it is likely that we will find a cure for the common cold
before we find any real elixir for current consumer dissatisfaction with the American health care system.
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